

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

18 December 1985

Executive Director

NOTE FOR: DCI  
DDCI

I support the basic approach in the proposed letters to Congressmen Brooks and Rangel. I also think it's fully appropriate to be on record with Mr. Hamilton with respect to our views on the issues raised by Rangel and Brooks' requests.

I question whether the language in the next to the last paragraph in the letter to Hamilton is as strong as it ought to be: "I believe that sensitive intelligence information concerning sources and methods, intelligence requirements and operations should be released only under the most compelling circumstances." I would consider adding this phrase: "...and then only to duly constituted oversight authorities."

It seems to me that the draft as written leaves open the possibility that we may be willing to discuss sensitive subjects with other committees under certain circumstances.

STAT

Changes to 2nd  
Page of Hamilton  
Letter

GR 3736/1  
ALL changed per  
DDCI

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: ER		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>Please autopen for <u>DCI</u>, per DDCI request.</p> <p>Be sure O/DCI gets a copy with note that DDCI requested DCI autopen.</p> <p>Thanks!</p> <p>Holly</p>		
FROM:		
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FORM NO. 1 FEB 62 244 REPLACES FORM 28 6

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-4259 2

OLL 85-3736/1

24 DEC 1985

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton  
Chairman  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is to inform you of my concerns over recent requests directed at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from other, nonintelligence committees of the House of Representatives. These requests call for detailed classified intelligence information about special activities, collection requirements, collection and assessment capabilities of the CIA and internal security information on both former employees and foreign defectors.

On November 18, 1985, Chairman Rangel of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, citing oversight of the narcotics policy as his authority, requested in writing a closed briefing on requirements for narcotics intelligence collection assigned to CIA; information on CIA's capabilities and activities to collect and assess information about narcotics cultivation, processing and trafficking; and information on links between trafficking, political insurgency and terrorism. Mr. Rangel's letter expresses interest in whether the Agency has enough resources devoted to narcotics collection and whether it has assigned the appropriate priority to this subject.

On November 26, 1985, Chairman Brooks of the House Committee on Government Operations requested an accounting of each polygraph test concerning Larry Wu-Tai Chin, Edmund L. Howard, Sharon M. Scrannage, [redacted] including polygraph tracings, questions asked, examiner notes and any other official or unofficial documentation on these cases. Mr. Brooks' letter describes his Committee as having oversight of the use of the polygraph by the Federal Government.

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On December 4, 1985, Chairman Solarz of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs orally requested for himself and Ranking Minority Member Leach a covert action briefing [REDACTED] This is just one of many instances where foreign affairs matters and those special intelligence activities called covert actions have overlapped.

The growing tendency of Committees of Congress to include within their scope of inquiry the oversight of intelligence as it pertains to their subject matter is of great concern to me as Director of Central Intelligence. Although I recognize that some intelligence-related activities may directly affect a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committees, the responsibility for congressional oversight of intelligence activities has been assigned by law to the House and Senate intelligence committees. These select committees have both the appropriate legislative mandates and the expertise necessary to conduct intelligence oversight and to protect intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.

If the oversight process on sensitive intelligence matters is to function effectively, I cannot respond routinely to congressional requests for information outside these normal channels. This Agency will continue, as in the past, to cooperate with any committee of Congress on matters where this can be done without exposing sensitive information needlessly. We also intend to continue to furnish intelligence products to those committees which have a need for that information. However, I would hope that congressional needs can be satisfied or coordinated in most instances by your Committee to the extent practicable.

My purpose in writing to you is twofold. First, I wish to be forthcoming with you regarding this problem and my position on it. Second, I seek your assistance in having the oversight committees play a more central role in dealing with these kinds of requests from other committees. I solicit your views and those of your Committee on this matter.

Sincerely,

*/s/ William J. Casey*

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

Distribution:

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OLL  (13 Dec 85)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-4259/1

OLL 85-3736/2

24 DEC 1981

The Honorable Dave Durenberger  
Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter I have sent to Chairman Hamilton of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The letter addresses my concerns over a growing tendency for Congressional committees other than the intelligence committees to move into oversight of intelligence. I have asked Mr. Hamilton for his views and those of his Committee on this subject and I hereby solicit yours and those of your Committee.


I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for what you personally did a short time ago to keep the Senate from establishing a special commission to investigate espionage and security. Your strong stand to keep this subject within the confines of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was a sensible and courageous act which helped to avoid what I am writing to Hamilton about. Despite what has been reported, I am not opposed to the Congressional oversight of intelligence. In fact, I strongly support it if it can be accomplished in a manner that does not damage this vital national activity.

Sincerely,

*William J. Casey*

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

Enc.



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OLL/  (13 Dec 85)

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